ASOS COMMISSIONED . . . END OF WEATHER CONTRACT
LETTER OF CONCERN, OCTOBER 2000

October 16, 2000

The Honorable Wally Herger
MEMBER OF CONGRESS
55 Independent Circle, Suite 104
Chico, CA 95973

Dear Congressman Herger:

We recently received notice from the Federal Aviation Administration concerning the commissioning of our Automated Surface Observation System (ASOS) and the termination of our weather observer contract. We understand the moratorium imposed by the FAA on canceling these contracts has been lifted, allowing the FAA to eliminate human weather observers across the country. The weather observer contract at Yuba County Airport is scheduled to terminate on October 31, 2000.

A few years ago, you assisted us in retaining our Flight Service Station until automation finally took over. You later helped to secure the human weather observation contract. Now, we are asking your help, once again, to retain the human element of weather observation.

Yuba County Airport is located in the Sacramento Valley area. We experience many days of low fog and changing conditions during much of the winter. It would seem more logical to keep our human observers in place while the ASOS is officially online to observe any variances and problems of the stand alone system. The ASOS was commissioned on October 4, 2000. On that date, our weather observers took a back seat and stopped transmitting data. The ASOS began transmitting as the sole weather observer.

The Yuba County Airport is a general aviation airport, with a significantly long runway (6,006 feet) and a crosswind runway (3,261 feet). Although we are not a busy airport now, we anticipate a substantial increase in operations as the Motorplex at Yuba County breaks ground and begins construction on a major raceway for Northern California, just about three miles south of the air field. As we improve our field and prepare for the increased traffic, safety is our number one concern.

The FAA’s own re-assessment documents variances between ASOS and human observation. These variances must be evaluated for the impacts they have on aviation safety. The methodologies used to collect information and reach conclusions should be the subject of an independent study from a safety perspective. The re-assessment itself was conducted by the same executive agencies, with assistance from the very manufacturer which promoted the use of ASOS and budgeted for the elimination of the observation contracts. These factors make it prudent to conduct an independent review of the FAA’s decision.

The decision to implement the ASOS system without human backup is moving forward despite negative findings in the reassessment. For example, human observers were quicker to note changes in ceilings in the majority of cases where ceilings were decreasing. In these cases, the human observer provided greater margins of safety by responding more rapidly than ASOS. FAA was unable to reassess performance during changes in visibility, because the study was carried out in overwhelmingly good weather, only 27.4 of 5,000 observed hours featured increasing or decreasing visibility data.

We understand there are already stand alone systems at airports. It is said that those systems are working well. If they are not monitored locally, how do we know they are working well? An error not reported or not found would be considered working well until those errors cause problems on critical information, until a pilot is misinformed by the ASOS data. The using public has not been informed the data they are getting is very "spot" specific and does not correctly represent their entire observation area. The ASOS only sees a fixed circle 60 feet in diameter at 12,000 feet in the sky. A human comparison would be like evaluating the sky looking straight up through a narrow tube. It is impossible for the ASOS to give an observation representing the entire airport.

ASOS, also, does not give immediate and continual updates as is claimed. Sensors collect information over a period of time that may be as long as 30 minutes. Then, the information is run through algorithms, resulting in old information being mistaken as current conditions. In good weather conditions this methodology is fine, but what happens during bad weather when conditions are constantly changing.

It has been determined that service at level A and B airports, ASOS must be reinforced or augmented by onsite observers. If the ASOS is not good enough to stand alone at some airports, it should not stand along at any community serving airports. At a manual (or human observer) station, or an augmented ASOS station, the required local tolerance checks on all flight related instruments are continually made by weather observers to insure pilot safety and correct data. If safety will not be degraded, why are service level B and A sites not using the ASOS as a stand alone system? In fact, the ASOS Users Manual lists observers as the level 1 step in quality control of ASOS. The manual further states, "onsite observers provide an immediate data check and often catch problems before the observation is transmitted."

A few years ago, the FAA removed flight service stations with the promise of same or better services. We did not get the same or better services, but we did get a human weather observer. Then, to get out of the same or better services promised, the FAA set new service level standards. Now, the FAA is using service level A, B, C, and D standards as a means of cutting services. The result is that lower level C and D airports will carry the brunt of the cuts. Weather observers are being removed from 152 stations in 42 states. Just another degeneration of safety and services to pilots and the public. Our ASOS is the official weather report that appears on the Weather Channel. The result of this action is gaps in the quality and quantity of information available to all who depend on weather information for their businesses and personal safety.

I have included a number of e-mails and other documents to bring you current on what is going on throughout the country. It is my understanding that at least four states have received six month extensions – Montana, Alabama, Michigan, and Maine. Montana and Alabama will get ASOS with human backup and augmentation at their service level D stations. It doesn’t appear the FAA will approve a six-month extension across the board. Our weather contractor was not advised about their contact cancellation, and, our Airport Manager was only made aware by a letter (attached). (At the same time she received the letter, the FAA had just renewed the lease for the weather observer space through 2005, conflicting information if the intent is to cancel the weather observer contract).

The FAA has been closing one station at a time, so few people have noticed. As with many of our services, these will be easily lost if nothing is said and extremely difficult to reinstall once personnel and backup equipment are removed. More information can be gained by contacting Randall Popelka of Senator Conrad Burns’ office and Elizabeth Ching of Senator Max Baucus’ office, both from Montana.

As always, we sincerely appreciate your support of our efforts at Yuba County Airport.

Very truly yours,

Brent Hastey
Chairman

Enclosures
copies:
Jan Christofferson, CAO
Mary A. Hansen, Airport Manager
Senator Dianne Feinstein
Senator Barbara Boxer
Rancho Murieta AFSS
FAA Burlingame
Airport Fixed Base Operators
Airport Pilots
Myv Weather Observer


 

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